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I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software technology commands widespread public
attention in contemporary society because the application and use
of computers has branched into most areas of daily life.' The de-
mand for software programs has burgeoned in part because com-
puter hardware such as complicated computer circuitry has be-
come very affordable to the general public.2
Thus, computer software programmers now enjoy a broadly
based commercial market for their software inventions. Unfortu-
nately, software competitors can appropriate software innovations
very easily. Software programmers, therefore, looking for some way
1. See, e.g., Sci. AM., Sept. 1982 (Scientific American magazine devoted its entire Sep-
tember issue to mechanization of work through the use of computers. It documented the
role of computers in such areas as design, manufacturing, commerce, and office work.). See
Branscomb, Bringing Computing to People, COMPUTER July 1982, at 68. Large grocery
stores, for example, use computer assisted electronic cash registers coupled to universal
product code scanners and weighing scales to assist cashiers in grocery store check-out lines.
These computer assisted devices help grocers expedite sales of goods, preserve complete
records of all transactions, and coordinate the aggregation of all sales records to produce
inventory and other business documents at the end of business periods. Ernst, The Mecha-
nization of Commerce, 247 ScI. AM., Sept. 1982 at 132, 140.
2. "The most startling change in computer system technology has been the dramatic
decrease of hardware cost by a factor of 2 every two to three years since 1945." P. WEGNER,
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY 2 (P. Weg-
ner, ed. 1980). See also C. SIPPL & R. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 919, 920
(1980) (Appendix N: The Progress, Impact, and Future of Computers). Several different
theories have arisen concerning the relationship of computer software and hardware. One
theory contends that the "program is basically a set of instructions that sets a computer's
switches so that it can perform a particular function." Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 281, 340-41 (1970); see also Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patenta-
bility, 6 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 1 n.3 (1977); REPORT OF THE PRaEIDNT's
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS IN AN
AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 12 (1966). A second theory views software programs as ad-
ding the control function to an otherwise incomplete piece of computer hardware.
Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View from 1979, 7 RuT. J. COM-
PUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 269, 279 & nn.46-48 (1980). Another theory argues that com-
puter software resembles a coded message "[b]ecause the program is stored in a computer as
data.. .[which] when written out, appears as just a string of O's and l's." Id. at 280.
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to protect their original programs, have sought patent protection
to establish legally recognizable and protectable rights in their in-
novations. The Patent Office and courts, however, consistently
have denied applications for patent protection of innovative
software programs, reasoning that the computer algorithm, the
foundational element of computer software, is an unpatentable sci-
entific principle.
The primary objective of patent laws is to advance the sci-
ences.3 The patenting of an invention essentially is an exchange
between an inventor and society 4-the inventor receives the exclu-
sive right to make, use, or sell 5 an invention for a certain period of
time, and society receives the benefit of using the invention6 and of
receiving full disclosure of the invention's underlying idea.7 Thus,
deciding whether an invention deserves patent protection requires
an inquiry into whether the work will deliver benefits to society in
excess of the costs that society must bear by granting the inventor
exclusive property rights in the invention.'
Because a patent is a legal monopoly,9 the requirements for
3. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Co., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945); P. JOHNSON,
THE ECONOMICS OF INVENTION AND INNOVATION 42 (1975) ("The encouragement of inventive
activity. . . is. . . a major argument for the patent system."). See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (1980).
4. See J. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 303 (1978).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part that: "whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent."
6. A lively debate persists about a patentee's right to suppress a patent. Courts cur-
rently hold that a patentee's "title is exclusive. . . and that he is neither bound to use his
discovery himself, nor to permit others to use it." Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 295 (1896), adopted in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. East-
ern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908). Justice Douglas, dissenting in Special Equip-
ment Co. v. Coe, 342 U.S. 370, 380 (1945), recommended abandoning the Continental Paper
Bag rule and returning to the rule that a patentee "is bound to use the patent himself or
allow others to use it on reasonable. . . terms."
7. The specification [of the invention claimed in the patent application] shall con-
tain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains. . . to make and use the same.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-15 (1976).
"The function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge." A & P Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950). In economic terms, "[p]atents are
a piece of social engineering which deliberately support monopoly at the expense of compe-
tition on the grounds that the benefits to the community of improving the potential flow of
new knowledge, outweigh the misallocation effects associated with deliberately creating mar-
ket imperfections." J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 302.
8. An inventor's exclusive rights under a patent last for seventeen years and give the
patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention .. " 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
9. R. POSNER, E CONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 199, 208 (2d ed. 1972).
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receiving a patent grant are very strict.10 The work an inventor
seeks to patent must fall within the scope of subject matter that
the patent laws protect.11 This subject matter requirement persists
as the major bar to patent law protection of computer software.12
The Patent Act does not protect natural phenomena, also known
as the "laws of nature," and descriptions of these phenomena.' 3
The descriptions of algorithms that computer scientists have ac-
cepted' and the manner in which these scientists have incorpo-
rated algorithms into the production of computer programs reveal
that algorithms conceptually are not equivalent to these laws of
nature.15 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court consistently has erred
in its interpretation of computer software algorithms by equating
them with mathematical laws.' 6 Consequently, the Court has held
software algorithms to be impermissible subject matter for patent
protection.'7 Software programs will not qualify as appropriate
subject matter for patent protection until the Court changes its
characterization of algorithms.
A change in the Court's characterization of algorithms, how-
ever, is merely the starting place for an evaluation of the propriety
of granting patent protection to computer software programs.
Courts also must consider the difficult policy questions concerning
whether the patent system should protect innovations in software
technology. The patent system is a mechanism that the federal
government has sponsored to achieve social welfare goals.'" Thus,
10. To receive patent protection an invention generally must be new, useful, and non-
obvious to a person ordinarily skilled in the pertinent art. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1976).
Courts have construed these requirements strictly. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S.
273 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor. .. ."
12. See, e.g., Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patenta-
bility: A Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 313,
333 (1980).
13. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 294.
14. An algorithm is simply a detailed process for solving a specific problem. See T.
WALKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 8 (1975). See infra notes 31-37 for a discus-
sion of software algorithms.
15. Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 12, at 333-35; Note, Algorithm Patentability
After Diamond v. Diehr, 15 IND. L. REv. 713, 730 (1982).
16. See infra notes 98-174 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Cf. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, STUDY 15; F. MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM (1958) ("a patent confers the right to secure the enforcement power of the
state in excluding unauthorized persons ... from making commercial use of a clearly de-
[Vol. 37:147
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the government must identify and assess the relationship between
a new technology and the purposes and policies of the patent sys-
tem before allowing patents to protect works in this area. Identifi-
cation and assessment of this relationship requires an inquiry into
the relationship between computer technology, public policy, eco-
nomic theory, and legal doctrine. 9
This Note analyzes the propriety of granting patent law pro-
tection to computer software by viewing this problem from eco-
nomic, legal, public and technological policy perspectives. Part II
explains the relationship between computer hardware and
software, discusses the role of algorithms in software development,
and traces the development of the computer software industry.
Part III analyzes the economic policies underlying the patent sys-
tem. Part IV identifies the patent law principles that are relevant
to the software patentability issue and discusses their underlying
policy foundations. Part V examines the Supreme Court's applica-
tion of these principles in the leading software patent cases and
concludes that the Court's failure to understand computer technol-
ogy has caused it to withhold patent protection from computer
software. Part V reveals that the Supreme Court has mischaracter-
ized software algorithms by treating them as unpatentable mathe-
matical laws. Part VI of this Note analyzes the benefits and costs
of granting patent protection to computer software and demon-
strates the compelling societal need for this protection. 'Part VI
also proposes an addition to the Patent Office of a small staff of
computer science experts to remedy the administrative problem of
processing software patent applications.
II. COMPUTER SOFTWARE: ALGORITHMS AND THE MARKETPLACE
The outcome of patent litigation, including requests for patent
protection of computer software, depends largely upon a judge's
understanding of what an inventor claims to have developed.20 The
fined invention."); R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 199, 208 (stating that a patent is a legal
monopoly); R. MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONoMics: THEORY, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS
304 (1978) (discussing the effect of patents on barriers to entry).
19. These areas of study often are incompatible and difficult to examine. Computer
technology is esoteric and not widely understood by people who are not experts in computer
science. The public policy considerations underlying the patent laws vacillate between the
need to encourage individuals to make discoveries and innovations for public benefit and to
reward inventors by providing legal protection for their innovations, and the desire to pre-
serve America's competitive economic system that abhors any form of exclusive market
power.
20. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For exam-
1984]
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Supreme Court's decisions that refuse to grant patent protection to
computer software contain three basic misunderstandings. First,
the Court improperly limited its definition of algorithms to proce-
dures that solve mathematical problems. Second, not all computer
software algorithms are equivalent to unpatentable natural laws.
Last, the Court failed to realize that software algorithms satisfy its
interpretation of the Patent Act's definition of process. 21 Because
of the Supreme Court's confusion, lower tribunals such as the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, and Board of Appeals of the Patent and
Trademark Office, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
are perpetuating an erroneous view of computer software technol-
ogy and creating a body of case law that rests upon an improper
application of patent principles to computer software programs.
A. Computer Software Technology
Software programs are the heart of computers. They contain
logical sequences of instructions22 that direct computers to perform
various tasks.2" Computer programmers begin designing software
by creating flow charts that express the precise method of solving a
problem or performing a task. They then translate this flowchart
into a language compatible with computers. 4 The process that
computer programmers use to create software programs is very
complex and costly. For example, the SABRE program that Ameri-
can Airlines used to coordinate passenger flight reservations con-
tained more than one million instructions and cost more than $30
million to develop.25 The typical cost of developing most software
programs, however, ranges between $50,000 and $500,000, with an
average cost of about $200,000.26 Without these costly or complex
software programs, however, computers merely are inert assem-
ple, one commentator points out that "'[w]hat the Supreme Court believes a [computer]
program is, or is not,' determines the kind and extent of legal protection that will be ac-
corded it. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court, as well as most other courts, is ill-
equipped to deal with the technological complexities of computer programs." Gemignani,
supra note 2, at 276 & n.3 2 .
21. See infra notes 98-174 and accompanying text.
22. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 271.
23. This Note's discussion of computers concerns digital computers, which comprise
more than 90% of all computers that are currently in operation. See C. SIPPL & R. SIPPL,
supra note 2, at 657.
24. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 276.
25. Id. at 276 n.36 (citing Burck, "On Line" in "Real Time," FORTUNE, April 1964, at
145).
* 26. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 276 n.36 (citing amicus curiae brief of Applied Data
Research at 3-4 & n.7, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
[Vol. 37:147
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blages of electromechanical and electronic modules. 27
Computer software programs fall into two broad categories:
operating systems programs and applications programs. Operating
systems programs control the general operation of the computer.2 s
Applications programs, in comparison, direct com-
puters-computer machines and the operating systems pro-
gram-to perform particular tasks.2 9 The applications program is
the most important software program to typical computer users
because it provides the instructions that tell the computer how to
solve their problems. The expression of the applications program is
an algorithm.30
B. Software Algorithms
Computer software is an algorithm or series of algorithms,
which are processes that solve problems and perform tasks.3 ' All
people unwittingly use algorithmic processes to solve most
problems they encounter in daily life.12 People who seek solutions
27. "Standing alone, however, a computer is like a piano without music. The 'music' to
make a computer 'play' is the computer program. Simply put, a computer program is a plan
for automatically solving a problem." Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's:
Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 205, 207
(1981). "A computer without any programming of any kind is simply ... a lifeless form
incapable of any task." Gemignani, supra note 2, at 271.
28. Operating systems programs provide the "[p]lans or instructions for controlling
input/output operations, remote data transmissions, and multiple users which can be used
and reused to control these operations." C. SIPPL & R. SiPPL, supra note 2, at 423-24.
29. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 271.
30. T. WALKER, supra note 14, at 42-45. Computer programmers frequently express
algorithms as a series of statements or as a sequence of commands in a flowchart. Id. See,
e.g., Gemignani, supra note 2, at 272-73, nn.14 & 16. Computer programmers design algo-
rithms to solve a wide variety of problems of differing complexity. Novick & Wallenstein,
supra note 12, at 334 n.175. For example, programmers have designed algorithms to solve
complicated mathematical problems, to bake cakes, and even to operate a pizza parlor. Cf.
T. WALKER, supra note 14, at 8-14.
31. I, HORABIN & B. LEWIS, ALGORITHMS 15 (1978).
32. An algorithm representing the safe procedure for lifting a cup of coffee off a sau-
cer, for example, might read as follows:
(1) Start;
(2) Place hand lightly on cup;
(3) If cup is not too hot to maintain contact, skip to step (7);
(4) Remove hand from cup;
(5) Cover hand with napkin-this unit is now the "hand";
(6) Return to step (2);
(7) Lift cup slightly off saucer;
(8) If cup does not begin to slip, skip to step (14);
(9) Replace cup on saucer;
(10) Remove hand from cup;
(11) Wipe clean outsides of both hand and cup;
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to complex problems, however, frequently choose to employ al-
gorithmic problem solving methods. Lawyers, for example, utilize
algorithmic processes in their highly formalized method of re-
searching and structuring legal problems." The Court's confusion
about the use of algorithms in computer science, however, stems
(12) Place hand on cup;
(13) Return to step (7);
(14) Lift cup to desired height;
(15) FINISH.
Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 12, at 334 n.175. A retail merchant could use an al-
gorithmic process, like the one that follows, to help it calculate income taxes for income that
it earned from selling goods at certain prices:
Table A
I. HoRABIN & B. LEwis, supra note 31, at 6. See id. at 8-13 for examples of uses for algo-
rithms in governmental agencies; pharmaceutical and chemical companies; banks, insurance,
and finance companies; manufacturing companies; and universities.
33. See, e.g., Rickert, Algorithms as an Approach to Learning, 12 JURIMETRIcS J. 171
(1971). For example, the following algorithm illustrates the reasoning process a lawyer might
use in determining whether a promise is enforceable:
[Vol. 37:147
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from the the historical association of the term algorithm with theo-
retical problem solving in mathematics.3 This confusion has
Is promise under seal in
jurisdiction where seal
not abolished?
ly NOI
consideration?
SNO
Promise is _Was there reasonable
enforceable detrimental reliance by
promisee in an area
recognized as basis for
promissory estoppel?
YES NO
Promise is Promise is
enforceable to not
extent necessary enforceable
to prevent
injustice
Id. at 173.
34. In mathematics the contemporary meaning of the term algorithm originated in
1951 when the Russian mathematician Markov used "the word as a name for his own theory
of effectively computable functions." Anderson, Algorithm in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER
J
Is promise in writing and
made enforceable by a
specific statute (Uniform
Written Obligations Act)
YES NO
YE NO
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caused the Court to equate software algorithms with unpatentable
mathematical formulas. 5 Confusion about the meaning of the term
"algorithm '3 6 has been a major reason why the Supreme Court has
refused to extend patent protection to software programs. 37
C. The Computer Software Industry
Until recently only a few companies specialized in producing
software products. Before 197038 computer hardware manufactur-
ers sold software with hardware as a complete computer package
rather than marketing software as a separate product.3 9 During
this time, typical computer purchasers did not have the requisite
knowledge to produce their own software, and unsophisticated pur-
chasers often did not perceive a distinction between software and
hardware. Presently, however, most consumers view software and
hardware as separate products.
Computer manufacturers today are producing more, better,
and less expensive hardware products than ever before. In addi-
tion, consumer demand for applications software programs40 also
has grown significantly.41 Two general types of applications
software exist: contract programs, which programmers tailor to the
needs of a single user, and general software packages, which manu-
facturers produce for the public in general. Most software develop-
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 365 (J. Belzer, A. Holzman, & A. Kent eds. 1975) (emphasis in
original) (citing Markov, Teoria Algorifmov (The Theory of Algorithms), 38 TRUDY
MATEMATICESKOGO INSTrrUTA IMENI V.A. STEKLOVA 176-89 (1951)). Subsequently, mathema-
ticians have defined algorithm as any recursive computational procedure. See Uspensky &
Semenov, What Are the Gains of the Theory of Algorithms: Basic Developments Con-
nected with the Concept of Algorithm and Its Application in Mathematics, in ALGORITHMS
in MODERN MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 100-234 (A. Ershov & D. Knuth eds.
1981).
35. See infra notes 98-156 and accompanying text.
36. The term "algorithm" derives its origin from the ninth century Arab mathemati-
cian A-Khorezmi whose writings have won him recognition as the father of algebra. See
Zemanek, Al-Khorezmi: His Background, His Personality, His Work and His Influence, in
ALGORITHMS IN MODERN MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 1-81 (A. Ershov & D. Knuth
eds. 1981). In medieval times the word "algorithm" referred to "Arabic numerals, and math-
ematical computations therewith... ." This use of the word gradually vanished. Anderson,
Algorithm, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (J. Belzer, A. Holzman
& A. Kent eds. 1975).
37. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of Benson and Flook.
38. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 274 & n.21.
39. Id.
40. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
41. INFOSYSTEMS, July 1978, at 86.
156 [Vol. 37:147
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ers42 annually produce contract and general applications programs
in approximately equal numbers.43 Although individual consumers
typically pay for the cost of producing custom-made contract pro-
grams, the individual computer companies absorb the costs of pro-
ducing and marketing general software packages.
The computer software industry has experienced phenomenal
growth, but software companies have not developed new software
technology quickly enough to keep pace with the burgeoning de-
mand for their products.44 This anomaly has occurred, at least in
part, because new software production requires large investments
of time and money' 5 to develop programs that competitors unfor-
tunately can appropriate easily.4" Thus far, software producers pri-
marily have relied upon the trade secrecy laws to combat piracy of
their software innovations.4 7 This method, 4  however, suffers from
two major drawbacks: first, it depends upon the maintenance of
secrecy and causes companies to hoard knowledge,49 and second,
its effectiveness is questionable because the requirement of secrecy
inhibits companies from aggressively marketing their products to
maximize profits from their ingenuity.50 Hence, software manufac-
turers continue to seek patent protection for their products.
42. The "typical" software company "is independently owned and less than 10 years
old. It has fewer than 100 employees, annual sales under $5 million and spends under
$100,000 per year on research and development." HARBRIDGE HousE, INC., LEGAL PROTEC-
TION OF COMPUTER SoFTwARE: AN INDUSTRIAL SURvEY, reprinted in CONTU: The Future of
Information Technology, in 4 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD
355 (N. Henry ed. 1980).
43. Id.
44. Note, Anomaly in the Patent System: The Uncertain Status of Computer
Software, 8 RuT. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 273, 277 (1981) (citing Bus. WK., Sept. 1,
1980, at 46).
45. See Root, supra note 27, at 209.
46. "The fact that software is a logical... product means that costs are concentrated
in development ... [and] there is negligible cost in producing copies of software once it is
developed." WEGNER, supra note 2, at 4. "It is really amazing how many good, honest citi-
zens who are kind to children and pets, help senior citizens across the street, and wouldn't
think of keeping the extra nickel in change that the newsdealer gave them by mistake are
perfectly willing to steal software." Rodgers, The Great Software Ripoff, POPULAR ELEC-
TRONICS, Nov. 1980, at 4.
47. See Gemignani, supra note 2, at 304; Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature
and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 492-93 (1981); Nimtz, Development of the Law of
Computer Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3, 19 (1979); Root, supra note 27, at
225-30; Recent Development, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computers and
Computer Programs, 9 PEPP. L. Rzv. 547, 563 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
48. Some software manufacturers also feel that the protection copyright laws give
their innovations is inadequate. Gemignani, supra note 2, at 291-92.
49. Note, supra note 44, at 280.
50. See supra note 46.
1984]
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III. PATENT ECONOMICS: BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND THE
EXPECTATIONAL EFFECT
The Court, by deciding not to extend patent protection to
software programs, has refused to admit that software innovations
are identical to scientific processes that historically have received
patent protection. As a result, the patent system has not func-
tioned to promote the advancement of software technology. Fur-
thermore, because software creators do not enjoy a legally pro-
tected property interest in their software innovations under the
patent laws, they lack adequate protection51 against appropriation
of their innovations. The threat of software appropriation discour-
ages software producers from spending time and money to create
new software programs because it destroys the producers' ability to
recoup costs of production and to profit from their creations.52 The
risk of appropriation is particularly great in the software industry
because software innovators basically create knowledge when they
develop a new software program, and knowledge is very susceptible
to theft. Patent protection of software programs would give inno-
vators a right to prohibit rival software companies from copying
and producing their programs. Moreover, the availability of mo-
nopoly rights to a software innovation would give software creators
the incentive to incur the tremendous cost of creating software
programs.
A. Knowledge as a Product
Software programmers essentially create knowledge when they
develop a new software program. Programmers' decisions to spend
time and money to develop an innovative software program de-
pend largely upon the potential of recovering the costs of their de-
velopmental efforts.5" Thus, programmers price their innovations
to reflect these costs. They recognize, however, that knowledge "is
expensive to produce, cheap to reproduce, and difficult to profit
from. ' 54 Two economic characteristics of knowledge as a salable
product are responsible for this deficiency: indivisibility of a
51. See supra notes 47-48.
52. Note, supra note 44, at 277; accord Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be
Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. R.v. 241, 244-45 (1968); Gemignani, supra note 2, at 292; see also
amicus curiae brief of ADAPSO at 44, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
53. See R. MILLER, supra note 18, at 304; J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 294.
54. W. NoRDnus, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETIcAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969) (stating that the "provision of informational services is
both an inappropriable investment and an increasing returns activity.").
[Vol. 37:147
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software program from its novel features, 55 and appropriability of
these features.
The indivisibility problem arises when software producers
market their newly patented software innovations, because the sale
of these innovations results in public inspection of their novel as-
pects. These novel aspects make software innovations attractive to
consumers and allow the creators to demand high prices for these
goods. The ability of software producers to charge high prices,
however, is essential to their economic success because software
developmental costs often are exorbitant.56 Since software develop-
ers presently do not enjoy legally recognized property rights in
their innovations, competitors are free to appropriate the novel as-
pects of these products when they appear for sale in the market.57
Once a rival has appraised the novel aspects of a competitor's
innovation, it is free to reproduce the invention58 and appropriate
the fruits of the competitor's creative efforts. An appropriating ri-
val often can undercut the innovator's selling price59 because the
innovator usually has incurred high fixed costs to formulate and
develop new ideas into a marketable invention 0 while appropria-
tion may cost only a few pennies.6 1 This economic phenomenon in-
evitably attenuates the incentive to devote resources to the pro-
duction of new knowledge such as software programs. Patent
protection of software programs would curb the problem of appro-
priation by giving a program's creator a property right in the
program.2
55. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 294.
56. See Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & EcON. 1,
12 (1969). "[W]e expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in invention and research
...because it is risky, because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent [to
the inventor himself], and because of increasing returns in use." K. Arrow, Economic Wel-
fare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention in THE RATE AND DnREcTION OF INVEN-
TwE AcTIVITY 609, 619 (1962).
57. Id.
58. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 294.
59. The producer who invents with the intent to recover developmental costs must
balance the potential costs of development against the probability of recovering those costs.
The factors weighing in this decision include the probable demand for the innovation, the
likelihood that competitors will appropriate the innovation, and the ability to prevent com-
petitors from entering its product market and absorbing its profits. Cf. J. PARKER, supra
note 4, at 306.
60. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 444.
61. Root, supra note 27, at 209.
62. "One effect of [the patent system] is to create property rights in knowledge." P.
JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 42.
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B. Barriers to Entry
Software inventors somehow must recover developmental
costs, and patent protection, if available, would help meet this
need by giving inventors the right to exclude others from reproduc-
ing their patented programs. The software inventor's patent rights
would protect against the entry of rival producers into the compe-
tition with the inventor concerning the use of its software program
and would give the patent holder power to demand monopoly prof-
its for the program. s These monopoly profits would recompense
the inventor for its developmental investment.
Without a patent, however, software innovators must find
other means to prevent rivals from appropriating their inven-
tions." ' They could attempt to prevent appropriation by concealing
the novel dimensions of their software innovations or by relying
upon their market power as leverage against appropriating compa-
nies. Most software producers, however, do not enjoy sufficient
market power to persuade competitors not to appropriate their
software innovations.6 5 Concealing the novel aspects of software in-
novations is an equally ineffective and undesirable method of
preventing appropriation because it inevitably causes software in-
novators to hoard their inventions, and acts as an impediment to
technological advancements and free accessibility of knowledge. 66
In addition, this concealment method probably would prevent
software producers from maximizing profits from the sale of their
innovations because consumers presumably will not pay the maxi-
mum price for a product unless they can appreciate fully its valua-
ble qualities. Thus, without patent protection, most software pro-
ducers probably could not prevent competitors from appropriating
their inventions.
C. Incentive and the Innovative Response
The availability of patent protection for inventions such as
software provides inventors with tremendous incentive to devote
resources to technological change.6 7 Patent protection eliminates
63. W. NORDHAUS, supra note 54, at 60-64. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 442.
64. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 301.
65. See supra note 42.
66. See Dunham, The Necessity of Publishing Programs, 25 COMPUTER J. 61 (1982).
67. "Only in the case of a patented product is a firm able to make the expenditures
necessary to bring the advantages of the product to the attention of the customer without
fear of competitive appropriation if the product proves successful." Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277 (1977).
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many of the commercial risks attendant to the marketing of know-
ledge as a product, such as the high probability of appropriation
and low probability of profit, by granting the inventor exclusive
monopoly rights in the product. Monopoly rights negate the fear of
poor returns on technological investment by undercutting the abil-
ity of rival producers to use the patented technology to compete
with the patent holder."' The patent holder, therefore, enjoys an
improved chance of profiting from its ingenuity.
The grant of patent protection requires the inventor to dis-
close the secrets of the innovation. Disclosure of innovative secrets
accelerates the diffusion of new ideas69 and contributes to the
achievement of optimal resource utilization by reducing unneces-
sary duplication of inventive efforts.70 Widespread circulation of
new ideas also increases the rate of technological development
throughout an industry.7 1
D. The Expectational Effect
The availability of patent protection affects an inventor's deci-
sion to commit time and money to innovative effort by giving in-
ventors an expectational incentive to undertake research and de-
velopment.7 2  The potential of acquiring a patent reward
complements free market mechanisms by encouraging research and
development in high cost ventures. The expectational incentive
provides the impetus for initiation of high cost inventive efforts73
and for continuation of projects when unforeseen costs arise. Simi-
larly, the expectation of receiving a patent will encourage compa-
nies to engage in much more risky, but potentially rewarding, re-
search and development programs. 4
IV. PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES
The Patent Office and courts have denied applications for pro-
cess patents on computer software programs, reasoning that
68. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 302.
69. Id.
70. "[The] patent system enables firms to signal each other, thus reducing the amount
of duplicative investment in innovation." Kitch, supra note 67, at 278. Patent holders have
a strong incentive to inform many companies about their newly patented innovations in
order to license the patent rights at a competitive price. Id.
71. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 304.
72. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 306. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 446.
73. J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 306.
74. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 446.
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software algorithms are not appropriate subject matter for patent
protection." This reasoning, however, is neither consonant with a
clear understanding of software technology nor sensitive to the pol-
icy and goals of the patent system.
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. '7 e Pursuant to this authority, Congress,
by passing patent laws, has established criteria that limit the ex-
tension of patent rights only to inventions which demonstrate a
potential for contributing a net benefit to society.7 7 The Patent Act
of 1952,78 which is the most recent and comprehensive patent legis-
lation that Congress has passed,7 e requires claimed inventions to
fall within the category of appropriate patentable subject matter
and to meet requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousnessY°
The Patent Act's requirements represent Congress' attempt to bal-
ance the policy of encouraging inventors to develop inventions that
benefit society with the need for well defined patent issuance
guidelines which promote orderly administration of the patent
system.
A. The Subject Matter Requirement
Section 101 of the Patent Act describes the range of subject
matter that is eligible for patent protection. It states that anyone
who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter" may obtain a patent for
75. See infra notes 98-156 and accompanying text.
76. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77. The patent law requirement that a patent applicant demonstrate that a claimed
invention potentially will benefit society is consistent with the constitutional goal of
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science." Id. Patents, however, are legal monopolies and con-
sequently are an exception to American society's general aversion to any form of unregu-
lated monopoly power. For example, Thomas Jefferson, who strongly opposed monopolies in
general, supported the creation of legal monopolies through patent grants and drafted the
first Patent Act. He gave the following reasons for his view: "Certainly an inventor ought to
be allowed the right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time. . . . Nobody
wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement." 5 WRrNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (H. Washington ed. 1807). See F. MACHLUP, supra note 18, at 27-
33.
78. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976)).
79. For a discussion of the 1952 Patent Act and the changes made thereby, see Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
80. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1976). For an excellent discussion of the Patent Act's require-
ments of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, see P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMEN-
TALS §§ 7.01-9.05 (2d ed. 1980).
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this innovation.81 The legislative history of section 101 demon-
strates that Congress intentionally worded the section broadly so it
would encompass wide areas of unforeseen invention.82 The 1952
Patent Act Committee, for example, stated that section 101 en-
compasses "anything under the sun that is made by man."8 De-
spite the breadth of section 101's subject matter eligibility lan-
guage, administrative bodies and courts have interpreted this
language strictly to insure that grants of patent protection are con-
sistent with the basic policies of the patent system."
B. Process Patents and the "Laws of Nature" Limitation
Section 101 specifically allows for process patents. Contro-
versy, however, exists over the meaning and scope of the term
4C 1185process. In Cochrane v. Deener"6 the Supreme Court an-
nounced the following definition of process that courts have ac-
cepted for more than 100 years:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given re-
sult. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state of thing.... The process re-
quires that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in cer-
tain order, but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary
consequence.8 7
Thus, a process is patentable if it operates upon "'certain materi-
als' to 'produce a given result.' , Application of this ambiguous
definition has caused courts to identify some subject matters that
do not qualify for patent protection, particularly ideas,89 mental
processes, 90 and discoveries of scientific principles or laws of
nature.9 1
81. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
82. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
83. Id.; see In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Worly, C.J., concurring).
84. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965) and authorities cited therein.
85. Note, supra note 15, at 714.
86. 94 U.S. 780 (1876) (patent granted for the development of an improved process of
grinding flour).
87. Id. at 788. The definition section of the Patent Act states that "'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1976).
88. Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 12, at 316 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780 (1876)).
89. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87
U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
90. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68.
91. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at § 1.04.
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This group of unpatentable subject matters is distinguishable
from patentable processes. Discoveries of scientific principles or
laws of nature, for example, are not patentable because they do not
produce something that previously did not exist.92 Rather discover-
ies such as Newton's formulation of the law of gravity merely iden-
tify something that existed but which mankind had failed to recog-
nize prior to discovery." The Supreme Court has held that
discovery of pre-existing scientific principles or natural laws does
not give the discoverer "the right to exclude others from enjoying
the benefits derived from the operation of" the laws or principles.9 4
Patentable processes, on the other hand, although they may re-
quire application of unpatentable natural laws, basically consist of
an act or operation, or a series of acts or operations, performed
upon specific subject matter to produce a physical result that is
new and useful to society.9 5
The Patent Office and courts consistently have recognized
"that applications of natural phenomena or scientific principles are
patentable" if the patent does not preempt society from enjoying
the benefits derived from the underlying principle."6 The determi-
nation of whether granting patent protection to a certain invention
would effectively give the inventor a monopoly over use of the un-
92. Id.
93. Id. Peter D. Rosenberg, a Primary Examiner at the United States Patent & Trade-
mark Office, distinguished between a patentable invention and an unpatentable discovery in
the following example:
A classic illustration of the distinction between the discovery of a scientific princi-
ple or law of nature and an invention and the relationship between the two is furnished
by the contributions of Benjamin Franklin on the subject of lightning. Franklin's recog-
nition of the electrical nature of lightning falls into the category of a discovery, whereas
his application of the discovery in the form of the lightning rod is an invention. While a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a
novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.
Id. at 1-16 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)) (em-
phasis in original).
94. P. ROSENBMRG, supra note 80, at § 1.04. Mr. Rosenberg stated that:
It would, indeed, be a vain and foolish gesture to grant a mortal the right to exclude
others from enjoying the benefits derived from the operation of [a natural] law. In
attempting to assert that right, one would have to do, in effect, what King Canute
did-command the tide not to come in!
Id.
95. Id. at § 6.01[1].
96. Comment, Diamond v. Diehr The Patentability of Processes and Incorporated
Algorithms, 8 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 535, 541 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978)); Blumenthal & Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentabil-
ity of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 454, 455-56 (1980)).
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derlying principle, however, is a difficult analytical problem." This
problem becomes paramount when the Patent Office and courts
face requests for patents covering new technological advances.
Courts engage in a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether to
extend patent protection to a new technology. In this analysis,
courts weigh the cost of granting an inventor exclusive rights to the
invention's use against the benefit society receives from patent law
encouragement of scientific innovation and advancement.
V. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE PATENT CASES
A. Supreme Court Software Patent Cases
1. 1972: Gottschalk v. Benson
In Gottschalk v. Benson9 s the Supreme Court considered for
the first time whether computer software deserved patent protec-
tion. In Benson Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot sought to patent
"a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to
convert signals from binary-coded form to pure binary form" (the
"Benson Program")."9 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) re-
jected their patent request, reasoning that the Benson Program
was a set of unpatentable mental processes and mathematical
steps.100 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) re-
versed 01 the PTO's decision and applied the "technological or use-
ful arts" doctrine10 2 to hold that the Benson Program satisfied the
97. One court stated that "[p]atents ... approach, nearer than any other class of
cases... to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where distinctions are... very
subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
98. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
99. Id. at 65. A binary-coded decimal numeral (BCD) merely is a representation of
each decimal digit in a multi-digit number with a binary-coded decimal number. "Thus
decimal 53 is represented as 0101 0011 in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to binary 0101
and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure binary notation, however, decimal 53
equals binary 110101." Id. at 67.
100. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686-88 (C.C.P.A. 1971). The mental steps doctrine is
a patent law doctrine which states that ideas are not patentable. Novick & Wallenstein,
supra note 12, at 317 (footnotes omitted). Thus, a "process that consists entirely of mental
steps is not patentable subject matter because it would create a monopoly over a law of
nature or a disembodied idea." Id. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146
F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Davis, supra
note 2, at 8.
101. In re Benson, 441 F.2d at 688.
102. Nimtz, supra note 47, at 13. Note, supra note 15, at 716. The CCPA developed
the technological arts test in response to the PTO's practice of using the mental steps doc-
trine to deny software claims. Under the technological arts test, the CCPA presumes patent
applicants have established a prima facie case that the subject matter of the inventor's ap-
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standards of patentability under section 101 of the Patent Act be-
cause it furthered the useful arts.
The Supreme Court reversed the CCPA, denied the patent re-
quests and concluded that the Benson Program was not a patenta-
ble process under section 101 of the Patent Act.103 After reviewing
process patent precedent, the Court stated that a process is pat-
entable only if it is "tied to a particular machine or apparatus or
[operates] to change articles or materials to a 'different state or
thing.' "o104 The Court equated the Benson Program for binary-
coded decimal conversion with the underlying unpatentable math-
ematical formula for carrying out these calculations.10 5 It then con-
cluded that the patent request for the Benson Program was an at-
tempt to patent a natural law, which if allowed, would preempt
society from using the underlying mathematical formula without
permission from the Benson Program's creators.10 6
This portion of the Court's Benson opinion suggested that
other software programs might meet its definition of a patentable
process, even if the programs utilized unpatentable natural laws, if
they instructed computer hardware devices to perform novel and
useful processes.107 The Court, however, then referred to a report
of the President's Commission on the Patent System 08 which
stated that, largely for administrative reasons, software programs
should not be patentable. 0 9 The Court concluded that Congress,
plication is technical and not merely mental when the patent application discloses a techni-
cal apparatus that implements a process. Nimtz, supra note 47, at 12-13.
103. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972).
104. Id. at 71 (citing Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1935) (patent granted for a
method of setting eggs in a staged incubator and circulating warm air); Expanded Metal Co.
v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 385-86 (1909) (process patent granted for a method of expanding
metal); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 729 (1880) (patent granted for a process of "man-
ufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at high tempera-
ture and pressure")).
105. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
106. Id.
107. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
108. Id. at 72 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT Sys., To
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY (1966)).
109. The report of the President's Commission on the Patent System provides in per-
tinent part:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack
of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these were available,
reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume
of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be
tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but
nonexistent.
Id.
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with its broader investigatory power, should be the governmental
body that ultimately decides whether software programs receive
patent protection. 110 This abdication of decision-making authority
to Congress suggests that the Court would not grant patent protec-
tion to software programs in the future.
2. 1978: Parker v. Flook
In Parker v. Flook1 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Benson
and strongly suggested that it would not extend patent protection
to computer software in the future. The plaintiff in Flook applied
for a patent on a method for updating alarm limits on process vari-
ables during the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.112 In cata-
lytic conversion processes, when any process variable such as tem-
perature, pressure, and flow rate "exceeds a predetermined 'alarm
limit,' an alarm may signal the presence of an abnormal condition
indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger." 1 " Flook created a
software program (the "Flook Program") that instructed a com-
puter to measure periodically the process variables and to use a
previously undiscovered mathematical formula to update the alarm
value.1 4 Although fixed alarm limits are adequate when the pro-
cess variables are steady, production technicians must update
alarm limits during transient periods in the catalytic conversion
when process variables are changing.11 5 The Flook Program pro-
vided a new method of updating alarm limits during these tran-
sient periods.
The PTO rejected Flook's patent application by reasoning
that the new mathematical formula constituted the only difference
between Flook's claims and prior art."1 6 Thus, the PTO concluded
that a patent on the Flook Program realistically would have been a
patent on Flook's unpatentable mathematical formula.1 1 7 The PTO
Board of Appeals sustained the PTO's decision because the
"'point of novelty in [Flook's] claimed method' lay in the formula
or algorithm described in the claims, a subject matter that was un-
110. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
111. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
112. Id. at 585.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 585-86.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 587.
117. Id.
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patentable. '" 1 8 The CCPA, however, reversed the Board's deci-
sion.1 9 It said that Benson applied only to claims that entirely
preempted a mathematical formula or algorithm and noted that
Flook sought to patent his program only as it applied to his modi-
fication of a scientific process.120 Thus, the CCPA granted Flook's
patent request by reasoning that it was not an attempt to patent a
mathematical principle.1 21
The Supreme Court assumed that Flook's mathematical
formula was the only novel portion of Flook's process and reversed
the CCPA. It reasoned that Flook's formula was an unpatentable
discovery.122 The Court also stated that merely using the figures
computed according to Flook's newly discovered formula to adjust
alarm limits did not make his process patentable.12 3 The Court em-
phasized that its decision should not "be interpreted as reflecting a
judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful com-
puter programs [would] not promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a matter
of policy. 12 4 As in Benson,125 the Court remarked that Congress
was the appropriate tribunal for deciding "[d]ifficult questions of
policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate
for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection
"9126
Justice Stewart, writing for the dissent,1 27 distinguished
Flook's patent request from the patent request in Benson and
agreed with the CCPA that Flook's process satisfied the standards
of subject matter patentability under section 101 of the Patent
Act.128 He stated that the Court in Benson held claims for a
software algorithm unpatentable, which if granted, would have
given the algorithm's creators a monopoly over an unpatentable
natural law.129 Justice Stewart argued that Flook, in contrast,
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
122. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
123. Id. at 590.
124. Id. at 595.
125. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gottschalk v.
Benson.
126. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
127. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in dissent. Id.
at 598-600.
128. Id. at 600.
129. Id. at 599.
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sought to patent an improved process for calculating alarm limits
for process variables in catalytic conversion procedures. 130 More-
over, he emphasized that Flook's process should be patentable
even though one step contained subject matter that would not
have been patentable by itself.1 ' He assumed "that thousands of
processes and combinations have been patented that contained one
or more steps or elements that themselves would have been unpat-
entable subject matter."' 2 Thus, the Justice concluded that
Flook's process met the Patent Act's subject matter patentability
standards and that the majority improperly imported the tests of
novelty and inventiveness of sections 102 and 103 to deny Flook's
claim. 3
3. 1981: Diamond v. Diehr
In Diamond v. Diehr13 4 the Supreme Court granted respon-
dents' application for a patent on a process they devised for mold-
ing raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.3
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 599-600.
133. Id. at 600. One commentator also criticized the Flook majority opinion for not
complying with a fundamental principle of patent claim analysis. See Note, The Patentabil-
ity of Computer Software, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 867, 886-87. Section 103 of the Patent Act
requires courts to evaluate patent claims as a whole rather than in fragments. This commen-
tator argued that the Flook majority ignored § 103's mandate by first isolating Flook's
mathematical formula from the rest of his patent claim and assuming that it was prior art.
Id. at 886. Thus, the Court explicity removed Flook's mathematical formula from its consid-
eration of his entire patent claim. Id. The Court then examined the remainder of Flook's
application "as a whole." Id.
The CCPA decisions following Flook are divisible into three general groups. See Note,
supra note 44, at 295. First, when a software claim does not include an algorithm, the CCPA
has held that the claimed invention satisfied § 101's subject matter requirements. See, e.g.,
In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), a/i'd sub nom. Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S.
381 (1981). Second, when a software claim includes an algorithm but also enumerates other
elements as the source of a claimed invention's innovation, the CCPA has held it to be
patentable subject matter. See, e.g., In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub
nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). Last, when a
software claim is purely mathematical, the CCPA has held them to be unpatentable subject
matter. See, e.g., In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d
32 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
134. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
135. Id. at 177. Before respondents in Diehr invented their rubber curing method, the
rubber industry had been unable to develop a process for determining proper curing times
largely because it could not obtain precise temperature measurements inside curing presses.
Id. at 178 & n.4. Respondents devised a process that continuously measured the tempera-
ture inside the press and automatically relayed temperature data to a computer that repeat-
edly recalculated the remaining time for curing. Id. at 178. Respondents' process used the
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The Court endorsed the claimed innovation as an improved indus-
trial process even though it required the use of a digital com-
puter."3 8 Despite its approval of the patent application, however,
the Court again accepted the erroneous characterization of
software algorithms that it developed in Benson and Flook.13 7
Thus, Diehr suggests that although processes that use computers
may be patentable, the Court probably will not grant patent pro-
tection to software programs themselves.
The patent examiner in Diehr relied upon Benson and deter-
mined that respondents' use of a computer in its rubber curing
process constituted non-statutory subject matter. 138 The examiner
then concluded that the remaining steps were conventional unpat-
entable steps in the rubber curing process.3 9 The PTO Board of
Appeals agreed with the examiner, but the CCPA reversed by rea-
soning that a process that satisfies the subject matter requirements
of section 101 of the Patent Act does not become unpatentable
simply because it calls for the use of a computer.1 40 The CCPA
additionally remarked that the respondents' claim was not an at-
tempt to patent a mathematical algorithm and characterized it as
the "resolution of a practical problem [that] had arisen in the
molding of rubber products. '14 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA's decision and held
that respondents' claim recited subject matter that was eligible for
patent protection. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
characterized the Diehr claim as an improved industrial process,
not an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.14 2 He stated,
however, that even if a patent claim for a process contains a math-
ematical formula, it will satisfy the subject matter requirements of
section 101 if the process, when considered as a whole, implements
or applies the formula to perform "a function which the patent
laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing) ....
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, rejected the majority's
Arrhenius equation to calculate cure times in rubber molding presses. See id. at 177 n.2 for
a discussion of the Arrhenius equation.
136. Id. at 185-91.
137. See supra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
138. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180.
139. Id. at 181.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 187, 191-93.
143. Id. at 192.
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holding that Diehr's patent claim presented a new, patentable pro-
cess for curing synthetic rubber.' He argued that the claimed in-
vention in Diehr, like that in Flook,'45 "was an algorithm that
could be programmed on a digital computer. 1' 46 He found that the
most significant distinction between the Diehr and Flook inven-
tions was in the drafting of the patent claims, not in the inventions
themselves.' 47 Justice Stevens, therefore, stated that the majority
should have applied a Flook analysis to decide the Diehr claim.'
48
Justice Stevens emphasized that, under the Flook analysis, the ma-
jority should have separated the Diehr algorithm from the rest of
the Diehr claim, characterized the algorithm as an unpatentable
law of nature under section 101 of the Patent Act, and then
searched the remaining part of the patent claim for patentable
subject matter.14 9 Under this analysis, Justice Stevens argued that
the Diehr process, with the exception of the unpatentable comput-
erized calculation of curing times, merely consisted of well known
conventional methods of curing rubber.'
50
Some commentators argue that Diehr foreshadows a judicial
trend toward granting patent protection to computer software pro-
grams.' 5' One commentator predicted that Diehr would "cause a
revolution in the practice of the Patent and Trademark Office"
and that "applications for inventions embodied in computer
software will be examined, allowed and issued as patents . , "152
Unfortunately, the Diehr opinion does not support this overly opti-
mistic view. Diehr seems to stand only for the narrower proposi-
tion that courts may not declare a process that satisfies the subject
matter requirements of section 101 for process patents ineligible
for patent protection simply because some steps in the process call
for the use of a mathematical equation or a programmed digital
computer.' 53 Under this approach, however, the Patent Office will
evaluate process patent claims by treating anything that relates to
144. Id. at 219-20.
145. Id. at 209-10.
146. Id. at 209.
147. Id. at 210 n.32 (citing Blumenthal & Riter, supra note 96, at 502-03).
148. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 212-14.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 208-09, 212-14.
151. See e.g., Blumenthal, Supreme Court Sets Guidelines for Patentability of Com-
puter Related Inventions-Diamond v. Diehr, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 117 (1981); Nimtz, Dia-
mond v. Diehr: A Turning Point, 8 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 267 (1981).
152. See Nimtz, supra note 151, at 267.
153. 450 U.S. at 185.
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a computer or its software as an unpatentable scientific truth and
separately evaluating the patentability of the remaining portion of
the process. Thus Diehr authorizes patent protection only for
processes that historically would have been patentable despite the
use of a computer in the process.
Furthermore, Diehr reinforced the Court's erroneous charac-
terization of software algorithms."M The Diehr majority re-empha-
sized the Benson definition of an algorithm as "a 'procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem,"' and went on to
say that "an algorithm . . cannot be the subject of a patent."155
The Court evidently does not understand that by granting the
Diehr process patent protection it authorized patent protection of
the software algorithm that controlled the operation of Diehr's
process. The algorithm in the Diehr process was not just the math-
ematical equation used to express the temperature and pressure
relationship necessary for curing synthetic rubber. Rather, the
Diehr program, and its underlying algorithms, completely con-
trolled and made possible the process that solved the problem of
obtaining accurate cure times for synthetic rubber.15 e Thus, the
Court's continued mischaracterization in Diehr of software algo-
rithms as unpatentable natural laws remains a major reason why
the Court will not extend patent protection to software programs
in the near future.
B. Supreme Court Mischaracterization of Software Algorithms
The Supreme Court has defined algorithms as procedures "for
solving a given type of mathematical problem ' 157 and has charac-
terized them as unpatentable natural laws.158 The Court's concep-
tualization of algorithms is erroneous for several reasons. First, the
Court improperly limited its definition of algorithms to procedures
that solve mathematical problems. 59 Problem solvers have not
confined their use of algorithms to mathematical contexts. 160
Rather, they have used algorithmic processes to solve many differ-
154. See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
155. 450 U.S. at 186.
156. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
157. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 n.1 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at
65).
158. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (in which the Court stated that "an algorithm, or
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature . .
159. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186.
160. See I. HORABIN & B. LEWIS, supra note 31, at 8-18.
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ent problems and to perform a variety of tasks.161
Second, not all computer software algorithms are equivalent to
unpatentable natural laws. Rather, courts should view software al-
gorithms, like other scientific processes, 62 as lying on a continuum
between clearly patentable and clearly unpatentable processes.
Software algorithms should lie within an unpatentable portion of
this continuum if they relate very closely to a preexisting natural
law. 6" For example, a software algorithm that mechanically calcu-
lates the length of a right triangle's hypotenuse by using the Py-
thagorean theorem"" would not be patentable. If it was patentable,
the program's creator effectively would enjoy a patent monopoly
over the Pythagorean theorem, a natural law. 6 5 A software al-
gorithm, however, should lie within the patentable portion of this
continuum, even if its bases are natural laws, if it directs a com-
puter to perform a new and useful process. 6 6 Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith currently uses a software program that has
received patent protection. 6 7 This program controls a management
account system (the "CMA") that regulates the flow and manage-
ment of money invested in an integrated cash management pro-
gram comprised of a mutual fund, a checking account, and credit
card account.6 8 Although mutual funds, checking accounts, and
credit card accounts all were available before Merrill Lynch intro-
duced its CMA, the system provides investors with new "synergis-
tic benefits" that are not obtainable by investing separately in each
type of account.169 This program deserves patent protection be-
161. Id. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
162. See e.g., Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935)
(holding as patentable a process for setting eggs in staged incubation and applying mechani-
cally circulated currents of air to eggs to ensure proper incubation temperatures).
163. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
164. See Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 12, at 336, for a discussion of the Pythago-
rean theorem.
165. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1954).
167. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
168. Id. at 1363-66.
169. Merrill Lynch's patent described only the algorithmic flow chart for its CMA. It
did not describe any of the mechanical apparatus that operation of the CMA required. Id. at
1367. The court held that the patent protected the software algorithm and used the reason-
ing that this Note advocates. Id. at 1372-73. The CMA provides customers with the follow-
ing new "synergistic benefits":
[First,] all money generated in the Securities Account is automatically invested within
a week into the Money Market Fund. This differs from a conventional brokerage ac-
count, which might not invest money generated from activity in the brokerage account
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cause it used natural laws to create a new and useful money man-
agement and investment system.
Last, the Court equated software algorithms with unpatent-
able mathematical formulas without realizing that these al-
gorithmic processes satisfy its interpretation of the Patent Act's
"process" definition.170 In Parker v. Flook"7 the Court stated that
it arguably has recognized a process as falling within the Patent
Act's definition only when "it either was tied to a particular appa-
ratus or operated to change materials to a 'different state or
thing.' ",172 Some algorithms, of course, like those that solve com-
plex mathematical problems which require only a mathematician's
mental powers to be completely useful,17  would not fall within the
scope of this definition because they are usable without the aid of a
"particular apparatus."' ' Software algorithms, however, interact
and thus some money might remain in an account without yielding any financial re-
turn. These proceeds, referred to as "idle cash" do not enhance the customer's portfolio
and usually is not compatible with the customer's overall financial objectives. By in-
vesting any idle cash generated in the Securities Account, into the Money Market
Fund, the customer apparently receives a greater return on his initial investment and
therefore is consistent with the customer's overall objectives.
[Second,] the cash balances in the Securities Account, shares in the Money Market
Fund, and available margin loan value of the securities in the Securities Account are
calculated when determining the amount of credit available in the Visa Account. Also,
payments made by Merrill Lynch to Bank One in payment of Visa balances, on behalf
of the CMA customers, are made in the following order of priority: (1) from the cash
balances, if any held in the Securities Account; (2) from the proceeds of redemption of
Money Fund shares in CMA accounts; and (3) from margin loans to the customer by
Merrill Lynch within the available margin loan value of the securities in the Securities
Account. This system of priority arguably provides for an efficient use of funds because
the customer will not incur the cost of a margin loan until all free credit cash balances
and funds invested in Money Market Fund shares are fully utilized.
[Last,] those customers who subscribe to the CMA receive a monthly transaction state-
ment from Merrill Lynch which details all CMA transactions during the preceding
month. The statement describes securities and options bought and sold in the Securi-
ties Account, whether on margin or on a fully-paid basis, any other type of transaction
effected in the Securities Account, margin interest charges, if any, Money Market Fund
shares that were purchased or redeemed, dividends on Money Market Fund shares,
purchases of merchandise or services that were made with the Visa card, checks drawn
against the Visa Account and cash advances.
Id. at 1361-62.
170. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1954).
171. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
172. Id. at 588 n.9.
173. See Uspensky & Semenov, supra note 34, at 100-234, for a discussion of the use
of algorithms in mathematics.
174. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9.
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inseparably with computer hardware devices to perform the
processes that the algorithms specify. Computer software and
hardware are useless without each other. Thus, software algorithms
should fall within the scope of the Court's definition of patentable
process.
VI. ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY: A POLICY QUESTION
The basic purpose of the patent system is to encourage the
production and disclosure of new knowledge by offering inventors
an opportunity to recover the costs of inventing and to profit from
their inventions. The patent system achieves this purpose by
granting inventors exclusive monopoly rights to make, use, or sell
their innovation for a limited period of time. Society benefits from
patent grants by receiving access to and use of the patented inven-
tion. Society pays for patent grants by allowing inventors to charge
monopoly prices for use of their inventions and by protecting them
from competition. Patents, therefore, should protect inventions
only if the protection's benefit to society outweighs the costs it
forces society to incur.
A. The Benefits of Granting Computer Software Patents
Society would benefit in several ways if patents protect
software programs in the future. First, patent protection would
cause an increase in technological knowledge in the software indus-
try. Second, it would cause this new knowledge to spread through-
out the industry with increased speed and trigger new software in-
ventions. Third, new software innovation would help society use
scarce resources more efficiently. 17 5 Last, patent protection would
cause more and better applications for software products to arise
and improve the quality of products software helps to produce.
If software programs receive patent protection, the disclosure
requirements of the patent laws naturally would cause the stock of
technological knowledge in the software industry to increase. The
patent application process requires applicants to disclose and ex-
plain the most innovative aspects of their inventions.17 6 Disclosure
would make this information freely accessible to anyone who re-
quests it from the Patent Office. 177 This disclosure requirement
also fosters rapid dissemination of the novel aspects of new inven-
175. See Kitch, supra note 67, at 279.
176. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-15 (1954).
177. See J. PARKER, supra note 4, at 303; 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1982).
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tions within technological communities. The combination of an in-
crease in the stock of technological knowledge and in the rate of
knowledge dissemination in the software industry resulting from
patent protection would fuel and reinforce the inventive process.
Further, the availability of patents would give software innovators
an expectation of patent protection and would encourage them to
undertake more and riskier quests for new innovation. 178
The widespread publication of new software innovations re-
sulting from the patent application process also would prevent
wasteful duplication of research and development efforts. More ef-
ficient utilization of inventive effort in the software field would
promote the development of many new and better applications for
software programs. This growth in the use of computers naturally
would result in higher productivity throughout the economy.179
The technological advancement in the computer industry that
patent protection of software programs would encourage probably
would improve the general standard of living in America. Several
empirical studies have concluded that technological advancement
is a major reason for growth in per capita income in the Western
world over the last few centuries. 180 In addition, if modern Ameri-
can society continues its trend of emphasizing the importance of
information processing and data collection, the growth and health
of America's economy increasingly will depend upon advances in
computer software technology. Patent protection of computer
software would help insure technological advancement in this area.
B. The Costs of Granting Computer Software Patents
Society will incur several costs if patents protect software pro-
grams in the future. First, software patents will give patent holders
the power to charge consumers monopoly prices for the use and
purchase of patented software. Second, patent holders sometimes
misuse patent rights in an invention to the detriment of society.
Last, the availability of software patents inevitably would cause
software inventors to flood the Patent Office and courts with pat-
ent claims. These claims would lead to exorbitant administrative
and judicial costs.
Software patents will force society to give patent holders mo-
178. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
179. See Ernst, SCIENTIFic AMERICAN, supra note 1 at 144.
180. W. NORDHAUS, supra note 54, at 8; Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50
REv. EcoN. STAT. 348, 354 (1968).
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nopoly pricing power over the use and sale of the patented inven-
tions. In theory, monopoly power causes monopolists to offer con-
sumers fewer goods at higher prices than they would in a
competitive economy.18l Software innovators inevitably must
charge high prices for the use or sale of their product to recover
the exorbitant research and development costs they incurred in
creating the software. Additionally, the mere knowledge of monop-
oly power over a product would induce software patent holders to
charge consumers higher prices for the software.
Two economic mechanisms would mitigate the monopoly
power that software patents would confer. First, the price of old
software programs that consumers readily could substitute for the
new patented program limits the patent holder's monopoly pricing
power. The sales of new patented software programs theoretically
will fall if the patent holder prices them significantly above the
prices of substitute software.8" Second, if a newly patented prod-
uct has no close substitutes and the patent holder charges monop-
oly prices for the product, then other inventors probably will seek
to develop products that will not violate the patent, thereby legally
capturing some of the patent holder's monopoly profits.
Some patent holders legally misuse patent rights in a manner
that suppresses technological advancement in a certain scientific
field. Patent misuse may occur, for example, when patent holders
prevent society from using or benefiting from their invention.
l8 3 It
also may occur when an enterprise engages in an aggressive effort
to patent all potential advances and improvements in a particular
line of technology. When this effort is successful, the patent holder
effectually has created a legal barrier which blocks competition in
that technological area for the lives of the patents. Such patent
misuse controverts the policies of the patent system and impedes
technological progress.
Finally, because of the high administrative and judicial costs
that accompany the prosecution and adjudication of patent claims,
the Patent Office' 84 and many commentators'" have opposed the
181. Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust
Economics, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1976).
182. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 126-27 (1976).
183. See supra note 7.
184. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 587-88 (The acting Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks argues that patent protection of software algorithms "will have a debilitating
effect on the rapidly expanding computer 'software' industry, and will require him to pro-
cess thousands of additional patent applications.").
185. Gemignani, supra note 12, at 312; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE
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issuance of software patents. While this problem is at odds with
the Constitution's goal of furthering scientific achievement, society
still must bear these administrative and judicial costs if software
receives patent protection.
C. Issuing Software Patents: Need for an Administrative
Response
The explosive growth of computer usage in most aspects of
human activity evinces society's compelling need for the extension
of patent protection to computer software innovations. Man's tech-
nological ingenuity seems to be the only limitation on the bene-
fits8 6 society would receive by encouraging software innovation
through patent protection. Conversely, the costs of extending pat-
ent protection to computer software l8 7 represent a familiar set of
considerations that the judiciary and patent administrators have
addressed and overcome throughout the history of the patent
system.'
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that one of its major
reservations about granting patent protection to computer software
is the tremendous administrative burden that this protection
would force upon the Patent Office.8 9 The Court noted that ex-
tending patent protection to computer software would require the
PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1966). Contra Note, An Anomaly in the Uncertain Status of Computer
Software, 8 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 273, 277 (1981).
186. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
188. One commentator, for example, succinctly described the historic but well-settled
policy debate concerning the propriety of granting inventors monopoly power over their in-
ventions as follows:
While scientists, and even judges, have on occasion spoken disparagingly of the motives
of those who would be so mercenary as to seek patents, the fact must not be overlooked
that inventors, however superhuman they may appear in the popular mind, require and
should be entitled to material sustenance at least at a level commensurate with less
creative segments of society. The economic philosophy behind the Constitutional
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sac-
rificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered. As was long ago recognized by the Supreme Court, absent a monop-
oly, an imitator would enjoy a substantial competitive advantage over the innovator in
that the imitator, not having expended capital to create and develop the innovation,
could afford to sell it at a lower price than the inventor.
P. ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at § 1.07.
189. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S
COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF... USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE
OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 14 (1966)).
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Patent Office to process a large number of new patent applications
without the ability to compare these applications to the tremen-
dous volume of previously created software programs.190 Because
the Court improperly has characterized software algorithms as un-
patentable natural laws,' 9 ' this administrative fear and the Court's
feeling that Congress would be a better forum' 92 for the resolution
of this patentability question seem to be the only legitimate barri-
ers to software patentability.
An addition to the Patent Office of a small staff of computer
science experts probably would remedy the administrative problem
of processing software patent applications. One computer science
expert'93 has stated that reviewing software patent applications for
novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness 9 4 would not be difficult
for most computer science experts. Many of these experts possess
extensive knowledge of current software technology and closely
monitor major software improvements.' 9 5 Thus, the Patent Office
probably could resolve the administrative burden of processing
software patent applications without completely renovating its pre-
sent operating structure. This small administrative change would
bolster the patent system's effectiveness as a social tool for pro-
moting scientific innovation and advancement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The patent system is a policy tool designed to achieve social
welfare goals. The patent system rewards inventors who develop
new scientific inventions by granting them a limited monopoly over
their inventions. These rewards encourage inventors to invest their
time and money in scientific inquiry. An inventor receives patent
protection, however, only when an invention confers benefits to so-
ciety that exceed the social costs of granting the inventor a patent
monopoly.
Computer software programs have not received patent protec-
tion primarily because the United States Supreme Court improp-
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
192. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595-96.
193. Interview with Professor Patrick C. Fischer, Chairman of the Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Computer Science Department.
194. The three requirements for patentability, "which are taken from 35 U.S.C. §§
101, 102, and 103," are novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 80,
at 8-1.
195. Interview with Professor Patrick C. Fischer, Chairman of the Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Computer Science Department.
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erly has defined software algorithms as procedures for solving
mathematical problems and has characterized them as unpatent-
able natural laws. The Court's conceptualization of software algo-
rithms is erroneous for several reasons. First, the Court improperly
limited its definition of algorithms to procedures that solve mathe-
matical problems even though people can use algorithms to solve
virtually any problem. Second, the Court failed to recognize that
not all software algorithms are equivalent to natural laws. Courts
instead should view software algorithms, like other scientific
processes, as lying on a continuum between clearly patentable and
clearly unpatentable processes. Last, the Court equated software
algorithms with unpatentable mathematical formulas without real-
izing that these algorithms satisfy its interpretation of the Patent
Act's "process" definition. Thus, some software algorithms should
qualify as patentable processes under section 101 of the Patent
Act, and courts and legislators, therefore, should weigh the costs
and benefits of extending patent protection to software programs.
Patent protection should extend to computer software only if
the benefits of this protection outweigh the costs. Society would
benefit in the following ways if patents protect software programs
in the future: First, the stock of technological knowledge would in-
crease in the software industry; second, this new knowledge would
spread throughout the software industry and trigger new software
innovation; third, new software innovation would help society use
scarce resources more efficiently; and last, more and better applica-
tions for software products would arise and improve the quality of
products that software helps to produce. These benefits collectively
would improve the quality of life in America and contribute to an
increase in America's gross national product.
Extending patent protection to computer software innova-
tions, however, would force society to incur several costs. First,
patent holders would receive the power to charge monopoly prices
for the use and sale of patented software. Second, patent holders
sometimes might misuse patent rights in an invention to the detri-
ment of society. Last, the availability of software patents probably
would cause software producers to flood the Patent Office and
courts with patent claims; these claims would lead to exorbitant
administrative and judicial costs.
We live in an age of widespread technological advance and
proliferating computer prominence; therefore, the balance of these
benefits and costs compels a conclusion favoring software patenta-
bility. The monopoly power and patent misuse costs of extending
180 (Vol. 37:147
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patent protection to software algorithms are familiar problems that
courts and patent administrators repeatedly have encountered and
resolved throughout patent law history. In addition, the Patent Of-
fice probably could overcome the administrative burden of process-
ing software patent applications by adding a small group of com-
puter science experts to its administrative staff. Thus, extending
patent protection to computer software would promote the techno-
logical growth of American society and improve the long term
health of the economy.
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